S ome prominent explanations of Europe's economic divergence from the rest of the world highlight the continent's unique political institutions. Max Weber proposed that politically autonomous cities were "critical to Europe's economic rise, because [they] allowed for the provision of secure property rights free from the ambitions of princely rulers" (Stasavage 2014, p. 337) . Other institutionalists have argued that parliaments were key to Europe's rise, because they too protected property rights against grasping monarchs (North and Weingast 1989; De Long and Shleifer 1993; Acemoglu et al. 2005) . Skeptics have countered that both town councils and national parliaments were prone to capture by rent-extracting special interests, thereby impeding development (Epstein 2000; Volckart 2002; Stasavage 2014; Ogilvie and Carus 2014) .
Another explanation holds that Europe's persistent political fragmentation drove the continent's divergence, by increasing merchants' exit options and forcing rulers to compete (Baechler 1975; Landes 1999; Jones 2003; Vaubel 2008) . Skeptics have countered that fragmentation also fostered over-taxation, free riding, and endemic warfare, all bad for development (Rosenthal 1992; Epstein 2000; Rosenthal and Wong 2011) .
In this article, I argue that Europe's political fragmentation interacted with her institutional innovations to foster substantial areas of "economic liberty," where European merchants could organize production freer of central regulation, faced fewer central restrictions on their shipping and pricing decisions, and paid lower tariffs and tolls than their counterparts elsewhere in Eurasia. When fragmentation afforded merchants multiple politically independent routes on which to ship their goods, European rulers refrained from imposing onerous regulations and levying arbitrary If parliament curbed arbitrary regulations and tolls in one realm, then neighboring rulers might have to respond in kind, even if they themselves remained without a parliament.
Greater economic liberty, fostered by the interaction of fragmentation and reform, unleashed faster and more inter-connected urban growth. To document this, I examine patterns of urban growth over the period 600-1800 CE Europe, the Islamic World, East Asia, and South Asia. In a hypothetical world of perfectly free trade and no war, city growth rates should positively correlate with those of their trading partners. I show that throughout Eurasia in the period 600-1100 CE. After the twelfth-century wave of parliaments and communes began, however, Western Europeand Western Europe alone-exhibited strongly inter-connected urban growth.
Because the level of fragmentation and the activity of parliaments varied within Western Europe, we can learn more by focusing on this and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2013) , I show that growth correlations were greatest in Europe's most fragmented and parliamentary areas. A difference-in-differences analysis shows that cities gaining representation not only grew faster but also became substantially more sensitive to urban reform, even non-parliamentary cities became more sensitive to urban growth, if enough of their neighbors became parliamentary. Moreover, control to constrain the monarch. Collectively, my results provide new support for some classic institutionalist theses while stressing freer trade, rather than more secure property rights narrowly construed, as the key mechanism.
HOW POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AFFECTED TRANSIT TAXES
There has been much debate over whether Europe's political fragmentation created superior exit options, thereby promoting economic development, or instead spawned free riding and endemic warfare, thereby retarding economic development.
1 To explore this issue, I begin by distinguishing two types of fragmentation that potentially affected European trade (cf. Shleifer and Vishny 1993) .
Intra-route fragmentation split governing authority along a single shipping route, thereby inducing over-taxation of the common pool of merchants, as noted by Stephan Epstein (2000) , Nicola Gennaioli and Hans-Joachim Voth (2011), and others. The canonical example is the Rhine River, where the original "robber barons" levied their infamous and excessive tariffs in the thirteenth century. In addition, intra-route fragmentation induced free riding in the provision of public goods such as security from bandits.
In contrast, inter-route fragmentation split rule across routes, thus enabling merchants to ship their products on multiple politically independent routes. In the rest of this section, I explore how inter-route (or exit-enhancing) fragmentation should have constrained the transit taxes competing rulers could levy. By transit taxes I mean all tariffs, tolls and fees that rulers charged merchants and merchandise traveling through their realms (and I use these terms interchangeably).
Consider two cities connected by n distinct land and water routes. Route 1 has the lowest physical cost of transporting merchandise (c 1 ), route 2 has the next lowest cost (c 2 ), and so forth.
Assume that ruler 1 controls routes 1, 2,…, e (the lowest-cost ones), but that routes e+1 through n are controlled by competing princes (one be -tory tariff surcharges. Merchants assess each route in terms of its total transport cost, TTC , which equals the sum of physical transport costs c last cost should have been especially heavy, given the medieval world's poorly developed capital markets. Expressing all costs as fractions of the unit sales price p, a merchant's net unit revenue is (1-c maximization requires shipping on the lowest-TTC route. 1 political fragmentation. Their arguments resonate with theoretical studies such as Tiebout (1956) , Hirschman (1970) , and Bates and Lien (1985) . Among those stressing the costs of fragmentation are Rosenthal (1992) , Epstein (2000) , and Rosenthal and Wong (2011 
If ruler 1 controls all the routes or has a big enough cost advantage, then max . However, when alternative routes exist that are both price-competitive and politically independent, the equilibrium tariff ruler 1 can charge declines.
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To illustrate the logic of this result, consider the Champagne Fairs. In the thirteenth century, these fairs constituted the premier European market for textiles, fur, leather, and spices. Late in the century, however, the Savoyards consolidated their grip on the Alpine passes, the King of France annexed the counties of Champagne and Brie, and both began raising transit fees. The Venetians and Genoese reacted by improving their galleys enough to make the sea trip to Bruges. In 1295 and 1300, the Count of Savoy lowered his tolls, in an effort to lure the Italians back (Spufford 2002, p. 166) . But the sea route became safer and faster as the years passed, and the fairs were effectively defunct by 1350 (Abu-Lughod 1989, p. 71) .
The coastal areas of Europe were naturally endowed with good harbors and afforded many sea routes with similar physical transport costs. The multiplication of European polities along the coasts should thus have entailed a substantial amount of exit-enhancing fragmentation. Moreover, coastal (as opposed to riverine) shipping was less exposed to redundant taxation by multiple rulers, unless there were narrow straits through which all ships had to pass. The net effect of political fragmentation should thus have been most favorable along Europe's coasts (and, similarly, along other Eurasian coasts with many natural harbors).
HOW PARLIAMENTS AFFECTED TRANSIT TAXES
Following Douglass North and Barry Weingast's (1989) seminal work on England's Glorious Revolution, many institutionalists have viewed parliaments as crucial mechanisms protecting property rights and, thus, promoting economic development. Critics, however, have questioned whether English property rights became more secure after the Revolution (for recent reviews, see Coffman, Leonard, and Neal 2013; Cox 2016) and argued that Europe's parliaments hindered economic development because they were prone to capture by rent-seeking interest groups (Ogilvie and Carus 2014) . Here, I focus on a narrower issue-not whether parliaments protected property in general, but whether they protected merchants from high and arbitrary transit taxes.
Urban representatives should have opposed tariffs levied on domestic merchants. Indeed, the "abolition of tolls" was a prominent demand in Europe's earliest parliaments (Blockmans 1997, pp. 40-41) and communes (Lopez 1966, p. 265) . While individual towns might have favored higher tariffs on foreign merchants, rulers would already have set revenue-maximizing tariffs and could veto further increases. Thus, tariffs in parliamentary realms should have been lower-and less arbitrary-than tariffs in non-parliamentary realms (North and Weingast 1989) .
Creating a parliament in one realm should also have reduced the tariffs nearby rulers could charge. To illustrate, suppose that rulers 1 and 2 are symmetric, neither has a parliament, and c 2 -c 1 max . In this case, 1 = c 2 -c 1 . Now suppose prince 2 adopts a parliament which removes his ability to levy arbitrary surcharges. Merchants will now weigh ruler 1's physical cost advantage against his greater ability to Moreover, the spillover effects of political reform should increase with political fragmentation. The monarch of a large kingdom might not lower tariffs in response to the birth of a nearby parliament, since few domestic land routes would be exposed to competition. In contrast, rulers in highly fragmented areas faced competition all around. Thus, the effect more fragmented areas. (Bulut 2001, pp. 49, 52) . In addition, merchants had to comply with the omnipresent price controls imposed by the sultan (Bulut 2001, pp. 36, 47) .
In contrast, the English crown "did not claim-or at least claim 767). Nor did the crown usually regulate the routes upon which merchants traveled. The English crown's relative inactivity in regulating merchants' travel and pricing decisions stemmed from its relative debility in levying and collecting taxes. First, parliament had to approve new taxes and tax the better to extract payments from them, would have required parlia--sentatives in the House of Commons would have opposed such tariffs. Second, most local tolls were set by towns that had acquired their collection rights in exchange for an annual farm paid to the crown (Masschaele 2007, pp. 150-51) . Centralizing control over the setting and collection of tolls would have been opposed by both the Commons and the towns.
Parliament's check on taxes, combined with chartered towns' traditional collection rights, meant that the legal authority to levy tolls in England was fragmented across many actors, in such a way as to enhance merchants' exit options: "if traders deemed a town's toll collectors too aggressive or too arbitrary, they [could] vote with their feet…" (Masschaele 2007, p. 174) . Their ability to do so meant that English "toll rates were exceptionally low, ordinarily constituting less than one percent of the average price of a commodity" (p. 161). On the Ottoman caravan routes, in contrast, "the general rate was 5%" (Bulut 2001, p. 52) .
All told, English merchants-as compared to their Ottoman counterparts-faced fewer price controls, had greater freedom in choosing the routes on which to ship their merchandise, and paid lower tariffs. They were thus better positioned to seize new market opportunities.
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FRAGMENTATION
Thus far, I have focused on one particular exit option-the ability of merchants to ship their merchandise on multiple politically independent routes. I have argued that this ability, combined with parliamentary representation for cities, enabled European merchants to conduct their business freer of tax and regulatory burdens than their counterparts elsewhere in Eurasia. Other exit options-such as merchants' ability to choose their home bases (Gelderblom 2013) , peasants' ability to choose the watermill at which to grind their grain (van der Beek 2010), and scientists' ability to choose where to live (Jones 2003, pp. 123-24)- ideas in Europe.
the form of better exit options for various actors, outweighed the costs, in the form of under-provision of public goods, over-taxation of commerce, and war? The literature offers many competing analyses and narratives, -tation sometimes spurred capital investment, as in the case of watermills (van der Beek 2010), it also led to hold-up problems in the provision of public goods (Rosenthal 1992) . While European fragmentation sometimes stimulated trade, as it did when the Italians pioneered a sea route to Bruges, it also led to the proliferation of internal tariffs (Epstein 2000) . While some emperors strangled trade in a fashion unimaginable in fractured Europe (see Baechler 1975; Jones 2003; Rowe 2013, p. 311) , other absolutist rulers (such as the Fatimids) pursued more trade-friendly policies. Absent a complete accounting of all relevant policies, how could one prove that, all things considered, a fragmented Europe imposed fewer burdens on trade than other Eurasian regions? 3 MEASURING ECONOMIC LIBERTY My strategy to assess the total burdens rulers imposed on trade is to examine inter-city growth correlations. The correlation between two cities' growth rates depends on human interactions between them and natural events that affect both. At one extreme, two distant cities might
The expected correlation in the growth rates of such isolated cities is zero. At the other extreme, two nearby cities might trade many germs, goods, and people and experience much the same natural shocks. The expected correlation in such connected cities' growth rates can be quite high.
The human interactions that potentially correlate two cities' growth rates fall into two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories: war and trade. Warfare correlates two cities' growth negatively if they category and includes intentional exchanges of goods and people, as well as unintentional exchanges of pathogens, with both possibly occurring through intermediary cities.
Operational Measurement
Not surprisingly, pairwise inter-city growth correlations decline with the distance between the paired cities (Hernando, Hernando, and Plastion 2013) . For example, London's growth rate correlates strongly with English cities' growth rates, weakly with German cities' growth rates, and not at all with Japanese cities' growth rates (over the period 1200-1800 CE). This decay of inter-city growth correlations with distance suggests that any assessment of how sensitive a given city's growth was to urban growth elsewhere should weight its correlations with nearer cities more heavily.
urban potential
, where pop it is city i's population at time t and D is the great circle distance between cities 4 should be high Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden (2013) considered a somewhat similar measure of urban interdependence. I discuss the technical differences substantive results at a few points in the text.
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Construct Validity: Market Integration
If two cities are integrated into a single market, then their commodity prices can differ by no more than the cost of arbitrage between them. Their prices should converge at any given time and move together over time.
If inter-city growth correlations measure how freely neighboring cities trade with one another, then high (resp., low) growth correlations should imply high (resp., low) co-movement in commodity prices. Consistent with these expectations, traditional measures of price co-movement, where available, agree with my measure of co-movement in city populations. For example, Roman Studer (2015) shows that overtime correlations in grain prices were much higher in eighteenth-century Europe than in eighteenth-century India. As will be seen, overtime correlations in city populations were also substantially higher in Europe than South Asia. As another example, Studer (2015) shows that price correlations in northwest Europe were higher than in central Europe, and the same pattern holds in terms of inter-city growth correlations.
Construct Validity: Growth Clusters
The validity of inter-city growth correlations as an indicator of economic liberty can be further validated by investigating clusters of growing cities. In each century, I identify all western cities that exceed the 90th percentile in both population growth and urban potential growth. There is no guarantee that such cities, which I call "seeds," will exist but in practice they always do in Western Europe 1200-1800 CE. If two or more seeds were within 100 km of each other, I grouped them and calculated their centroid. All non-seed cities lying within 1 degree of latitude and longitude of the seed centroid and experiencing above-median growth rates were dubbed "neighbors." The cluster containing the largest number of seeds plus neighbors was the "top cluster." Consistent with the idea that clustered urban growth reveals inter-city trade, the top clusters in Western Europe consisted of the cities at the forefront of proto-industrial development in each century. For example, in 1200 the top cluster comprised Bruges, Brussels, Ghent and Liege in Belgium, along with Dunkerque and Saint-Omer in northern France (I have underlined the seeds). By 1300, this cluster had expanded to include Bruges, Brussels, Ghent and Leuven in Belgium, Arras, Dunkerque and Saint-Omer in northern France, and Dordrecht and Middelburg in the Netherlands. An equally large cluster of nine cities emerged in Tuscany. By 1400, the top cluster had moved north into the Netherlands, centering on Alkmaar, Amsterdam, Delft, Dordrecht, Gouda, Haarlem, Hertogenbosch, Leiden, Utrecht, and Zaandam. The top cluster remained in the Netherlands in 1500 and 1600. By 1700 two roughly equal clusters existed in the Netherlands and England. In 1800, the top cluster lay in the English midlands.
INTER-CITY GROWTH CORRELATIONS IN EURASIA: SOME INITIAL FINDINGS
I now compare inter-city growth correlations for 1,033 Eurasian cities whose populations are documented at 100-year intervals over the period 600-1800 CE. The data, based mostly on Tertius Chandler (1987) , are described in the Appendix. Following Ronald Findlay and Kevin Europe (556 cities), Eastern Europe (174 cities), the Islamic World (86 cities), East Asia (117 cities), and South Asia (100 cities). I focused on two periods: 600-1100 and 1200-1800. These periods are meaningful in European history, as the wave of parliaments and communes begins largely in the twelfth century.
I begin by running a series of bivariate regressions of Growth jt (the logarithmic growth rate of population) on UPGrowth jt (the logarithmic growth rate of urban potential). 6 The results of these regressions, one for each region-period, are presented in Table 1 ; the Appendix provides summary statistics.
As can be seen, European cities' growth rates were negligibly correlated in the pre-parliamentary period (600-1100 CE). The relatively isolated and autarkic cities of the early medieval period did not grow in tandem. After the great revival of trade, however, cities' growth rates were positively correlated (1200-1800 CE). Bosker, Buringh, and van Table 1 shows that the most inter-connected urban growth arose in Western Europe after 1200, which was the only Eurasian region-period combining high political fragmentation and high parliamentary density. Eastern Europe, with some fragmentation and some parliaments after Asia 1200-1800 CE (a period including China's second commercial revolution) also exhibits some inter-connected urban growth, it is weaker correlations. The lack of correlation in the Islamic World 600-1100 CE which I return later.
Comparing London and Istanbul illustrates inter-city growth correlations more concretely. If one models the population of 50 English and 25 Anatolian cities over the period 1200-1800 CEtions, but Istanbul's (or Constantinople's) population is statistically unrelated to urban populations elsewhere in Anatolia. Istanbul/Constantinople was a classic imperial capital, which grew large by commanding the resources it needed (cf. Boyar 2013; Bulut 2001) . In contrast, London was a prototypical trading center, which grew via voluntary exchanges (cf. van Bavel et al. 2013) . Figure 1 plots the century-by-century correlation between Growth jt and UPGrowth jt growth correlations in the Islamic World and Western Europe were very similar in 600, 800, 1000, and 1100. Beginning in 1200, however, Europe exhibits noticeably more inter-connected urban growth, lapsing only in 1500 and 1600 (as I discuss in more detail later in the article).
Together, Table 1 and Figure 1 suggest a sea-change in need of explanation. Why were urban growth patterns similar across Eurasia in 600-1100 CE, only to diverge thereafter? Why did Western and Eastern Europe after 1200 exhibit by far the largest positive correlations between nearby cities' growth rates? Logically, inter-city growth correlations must have been driven by some combination of Nature, war, and trade. 
INTER-CITY GROWTH CORRELATIONS:
A MORE CONTROLLED LOOK 
indicates whether the cities in a given region tended to grow in tandem with their neighbors.
The errors (here and henceforward) are clustered at the modern country level. Modern country boundaries, albeit imperfectly, sort cities into groups that are linguistically and culturally similar, facilitating the Clustering at the city level only makes sense if one believes that the spatial decay assumed in computing the urban potential scores adequately captures all relevant spillover and diffusion processes so that, controlling for growth in urban potential, inter-city growth rates are spatially uncorrelated. I discuss this matter further in the Online Appendix. city's "route substitutability"-how many different routes were available costs increased as one moved from better to worse routes. cold weather, or the Golden Horde to affect different regions differently.
and war affect inter-city growth correlations.
The main results (Model 1) show that substantively and statistically signi cant inter-city growth correlations existed in post-1200 Western Europe alone -cant in Eastern Europe, the Islamic World, and East Asia, and negative section, I consider a series of doubts that might be raised about these
Urban Growth in Islam's Golden Age
between 33 and 50 percent (depending on the century). Meanwhile, the -cant evidence that Muslim cities were interdependent (see the Online Appendix for details).
tant, consider Muslim cities during the eighth century. The Arab conquest of the Maghreb and Iberia during that century fostered urban growth in the region-wide tendency for all frontier cities to grow as a by-product of conquest, cities in Iberia and the Maghreb appear to have been only weakly inter-connected.
Data Quality
Is the contrast between Western Europe and the rest of Eurasia an artifact of there being more data for the west? To address this concern, Model 2 restricts the West European sample to cities whose populations exceeded 40,000 at some point between 800 and 1800 and recalculates the urban potential scores using only these qualifying cities. This ensures that the same cutoff is used throughout Eurasia. As can be seen, growth correlations among Europe's largest cities were comparable to those among European cities more generally. Table 2 's results could be due to larger errors in estimating nonwestern cities' populations. Such a premise is questionable, especially for big cities in stable empires. Even if measurement errors were larger 3 (discussed later), all regions except Western Europe show negative toward zero.
Endogenous Economic Growth
Once cities start to grow at a high enough rate, it is possible that interconnected growth follows naturally, due to purely economic interactions. growth area of China, to the Netherlands, a high-growth area of Europe. As can be seen in the Online Appendix, cities in the Yangzi Delta did not exhibit inter-connected growth, whereas the Dutch cities did.
To identify areas of high growth more systematically, I divided Eurasia into 204 gridcells, each 5 degrees of latitude (roughly 550 km) wide and 5 degrees of longitude (roughly 400 km) tall. As a point of reference, gridcell number 149 contains a rectangle lying mostly in southern France and extending from Carcassone to Marseille on the southern border and from Bourges to Besançon on the northern border. I then reran Model 1 on a sample of Eurasian cities from high-growth gridcells (namely, all cells experiencing growth rates above the median for Western Europe). As shown in the Online Appendix, high-growth areas outside Western inter-city growth correlations did not automatically arise as soon as some threshold growth rate was passed.
Other Robustness Checks
Were the areas within which cities shared common natural shocks concern, I reran Model 1 with a full panel of gridcell-century indicators.
Nature on inter-city growth correlations.
The results (Model 3) show that Western European cities' growth was each gridcell-century. Everywhere else in Eurasia, however, inter-city growth correlations were negative and coercive reallocations of assets. For example, new emperors sometimes founded new capital cities, which then extracted resources from their neighbors by command.
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I also explore whether the emergence of inter-connected urban growth in Western Europe could have been driven by war, rather than trade. In Western Europe, neighboring cities often traded with each other and, when wars broke out, allied with each other. Thus, both trade and war positively correlated their growth. When European wars pitted local cities against one another, mainly in the Hundred Years War, the Great Italian Wars, and the wars of religion, inter-city growth correlations declined substantially-as witnessed by the dip in Figure 1 in the years 1500 and 1600.
To begin to parse the effects of war and trade, Model 4 restricts the sample to the period before Europe's military revolutions (1200-1500 CE) and again controls for gridcell-century effects. Although inter-city growth correlations in Western Europe are not statistically greater than zero in this period, they are statistically greater than the correlations in UPGrowth in on UPGrowth in the other regions. There is no observable delay between the posited causes-the creation of local and national assemblies in a context of great political fragmentation-and the effects.
allay such a concern, I replicated Model 1's results using an ArrelanoBond estimator (see the Online Appendix).
Summary
I have shown that urban growth in post-1200 Western Europe was more inter-connected than it had been before and then it was in other European merchants, after the onset of self-governing cities and national elsewhere. If representative institutions were the key factors enhancing the freedom of trade, however, then we should see differences within Europe, since institutions varied across both time and space.
INTER-CITY GROWTH CORRELATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE
In this section, I exploit Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden's dataset on city populations in the western core over the period 800-1800 CE. Crucially for my purposes, their widely used dataset provides comprehensive information on Europe's experience with representative institutions. Thus, one can gauge how the birth or demise of parliaments and city councils affected European cities' growth.
(1), 9 adding two new indicator variables, Commune jt was self-governing in century t) and Parliament jt in a parliamentary realm in century t). I also add a battery of time-varying controls from Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden's dataset: whether and when each city had a bishop, an archbishop, a university, and a madrasas; and whether and when each city was a capital, was under Muslim control, to some run by Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden, estimates the effects of institutional innovations using a difference-in-differences approach.
The results show that a city gaining communal status experienced a growth rate that was, on average, 10 percent higher thereafter (see Model 1 of Table 3 ). Cities whose realms gained a national parliament typically experienced growth rates that were higher by about 16 percent.
van Zanden report in their Table 3 (p. 1434).
Measuring the Strength of Parliaments
In contrast to Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden, Carles Boix (2015)relying on much the same data-concludes that parliaments were "causally irrelevant" to growth. The main reason for this disagreement has to do with how parliaments were coded. Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden coded a dummy variable, equal to 1 if parliament sat at least once in the previous century. Boix (p. 219) used a continuous variable, the "fraction of years with parliamentary meetings in a given century." This difference in coding turns out to be the key explanation for the difference between Boix's results and those of Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden Thus, it is important to explain why I prefer Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden's variable.
Both Boix and Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden seek to assess the institutional strength of parliament. A sensible ordinal measure, similar to one used by David Stasavage (2010, pp. 630-31) , ranks parliaments as follows:
(1) Parliament suspended (or never existed).
(2) Parliament meets but controls neither taxing nor spending.
(3) Parliament meets and controls taxing, but not spending. (4) Parliament meets and controls both taxing and spending.
As no parliament lacking control over taxes nonetheless controlled spending, these four categories are exhaustive. Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden's dummy variable distinguishes suspended or non-existent parliaments (level 1) from the rest (levels 2-4). The logic of Boix's "fraction of years" variable is that more powerful assemblies should have met more often. The problem is that many parliamentary cities experienced no change in parliamentary strength (as measured by the four-point scale earlier). For such cities, when their nations faced threats (Stasavage 2016, p. 18) . Thus, if one wants to test the institutionalist thesis, one should use Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden's variable, not Boix's.
It is possible that economic development (proxied by urban population growth) led to the formation of parliaments, rather than parliaments promoting economic growth. This is what Scott Abramson and Boix (2014) and Boix (2015) , among others, argue. Perhaps the most compelling response, articulated by Stasavage (2016) , runs as follows. Circa 1000 CE, Europe was likely poorer than the Byzantine Empire, the Abassid Caliphate, and especially the Chinese Empire. Yet, only Europe developed communes and parliaments over the next few hundred years. Thus, economic development per se did not promote parliamentarism.
THE MEDIATING EFFECTS OF PARLIAMENTS
For my purposes, it is more important to examine how representative institutions facilitated economic liberty, thereby increasing inter-city growth correlations, than to examine their direct effects on growth. To explore this issue, Model 2 adds an interaction term, UPGrowth jt *Parliament jt , to the analysis.
The main effects of parliaments and communes, as well as the effects of the control variables, remain similar to those found in Model 1. The UPGrowth jt *Parliament jt indicates that cities increased their sensitivity to nearby urban growth by about 50 percent, when their realms became parliamentary.
Did the introduction of parliaments coincide with more warfare, which then affected growth correlations? To address this concern, I control for each city's exposure to warfare (in Model 3). Using the list distance d kj
∑ , where B t is the set of battles occurring in century t.
The analysis is restricted to the period before Europe's military revolutions (1200-1500 CE). As can be seen, European cities in this period were unresponsive to growth in neighboring cities, if their realms had 1 that western cities were no different than their Eurasian counterparts prior to 1200. Once a European city's realm became parliamentary, UPGrowth jt *Parliament jt ). Meanwhile, the main effect of introducing after their realm became parliamentary. As for warfare, cities closer to thesis explored by Mark Dincecco and Massimiliano Onorato (2015) .
Spillovers
According to my account, princely cities near newly parliamentary cities should themselves have become more sensitive to urban growth in their environs. To investigate this possibility, I calculate each city's parliamentary urban potential: the sum of populations in parliamentary on non-parliamentary cities in Western Europe 1200-1500 CE regressed their population growth on the growth of their ordinary urban potential and the usual battery of controls. The results (reported in the Online Appendix) show a negative UPGrowth: princely cities in the west were no more responsive to general urban growth than were other Eurasian cities in this period.
I then replaced UPGrowth with PUPGrowth, the growth rate of each city's parliamentary urban potential. The results (again in the Online Appendix) show that princely cities were highly responsive to growth in nearby parliamentary cities. This is consistent with the idea that such cities matched the parliamentary cities' policies, in order to participate in the growing market economy. In other words, political reforms had important spillover effects for economic liberty.
Spurious Correlation
Did political fragmentation give merchants exit options, which they leveraged to extract both trade-friendly policies and parliamentary representation? If so, then the key factor would be merchants' de facto power institutions) might have been only spuriously correlated with improved trade and the higher inter-city growth correlations that it fostered. century effects. Thus, the effects of parliaments and communes uncovfor their de facto power.
It makes sense, moreover, that representative institutions would help merchants protect their interests, above and beyond any leverage they had due to exit options. In order to expand their commercial enterprises, to ship their merchandise on roads and waterways where it could easily be taxed. If they relied solely on exit threats-e.g., that they would relocate in response to princely predation-then it would only be a matter of time until a large enough liquidity shock convinced a desperate prince to of relocation or endure the depredation. Thus, merchants sought greater security, in the form of voting rights enabling them to block the prince being limited to retaliating after the fact.
WEAK AND STRONG PARLIAMENTS
The ability of medieval parliaments to keep tariffs low depended on their ability to approve or deny the ruler's tax requests. Some parliaments, such as those in England and the Netherlands, successfully defended their tax power. Others, most notably the Estates General of France, originally had the power to block new taxes but later lost it, whereas the Polish Diet always lacked any corporate power to approve new taxes (since unanimous consent was required). In both France and Poland, urban represencould not block their monarch's reach for new taxes, while the Polish could not materially assist their king, should opposition from any of the great landed magnates arise. Table 4 provides evidence that parliament's tax power mattered. In particular, the bivariate correlation between population growth and urban controlled taxes.
France offers the most striking pattern. Before the Estates General began meeting, the average inter-city growth correlation (within the -ries during which the Estates controlled taxes, the correlation tripled in
The other cases exhibit a similar pattern. Growth correlations were low when there was no parliament according to Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden's coding (the United Kingdom prior to 1400 and the The most important results (detailed in the Online Appendix) were that cities were negatively affected by nearby urban growth in their nontheir strong-parliamentary eras. In terms of absolute levels, cities were -mentary eras.
Qualitatively similar results hold if one runs separate countryby-country regressions (although they are statistically weak for the Netherlands). Moreover, similar results hold if one replaces Meangrowth population.
The results suggest that parliaments promoted freer trade and hence more inter-connected urban growth. Somewhat in contrast, Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden found a stronger mediating effect for communes those I report in Table 3 (see the Online Appendix for details).
THE GIFTS OF DISCORDIA AND EUROPEAN DIVERGENCE
As do Jean Baechler (1975 ), Eric Jones (2003 , and others, I view the collapse of central authority after the fall of the Roman and Carolingian Empires as the root cause of European divergence. Imperial collapse led to a wave of local self-defense and state-building efforts. Later, using tools provided by the legal revolution of the twelfth century (Berman recognition-spawning city-states, communes, liberties, charters and parliaments. The European landscape was covered by hundreds of small polities, most of them bottom-up creations rather than top-down impositions (Spruyt 1994; Blockmans 1997; Abramson forthcoming) .
The spread of parliaments and communes interacted with Europe's continuing fragmentation to free merchants from central regulation and taxation. Economic liberty sparked a wave of innovations lowering transaction costs (Greif 2006; de Moor 2008) . Economic liberty also spread pathogens, ideas, laborers, and goods, which powerfully and positively correlated city growth rates. My analyses document a relatively sudden emergence of inter-connected urban growth in Western Europe and show that it was driven mainly by trade (as both Nature and war were controlled).
11 In this section, I consider two questions that my account raises.
Why Not Sooner?
If Europe's political fragmentation and representative institutions fostered economic liberty, then why did per capita incomes in Europe not begin to diverge sooner? One response is that Malthusian dynamics should have limited European divergence. Even with marginally better economic liberty compounding over many years, populations could still grow much faster than productivity, forcing per capita incomes down by the remorseless logic of Malthus' iron law of wages (Voigtländer and Voth 2012) . Given Europe's relative under-development in 1200, it is perhaps not surprising that Western European incomes do not begin to diverge until 1500 (Broadberry 2013) .
Industrial Revolution. Why did the trio of political fragmentation, representative institutions and economic liberty not spark faster growth than it did? By way of answer, I would stress that each element in the trio could harm economic growth, as well as helping it.
Political fragmentation led to wars that killed many people and destroyed much property (Rosenthal and Wong 2011) .
12 Moreover, frag-11 Additional evidence of post-1200 Europe's relatively free trade is that cities in this regionperiod complied better with Zipf's Law than any other region-period. To document this is beyond the scope of the present article. Dittmar 2011 provides some relevant analysis.
12 That said, warfare could boost urban growth, as cities became "safe harbors" (Dincecco and Onorato 2015). Moreover, because medieval wars reduced the population faster than they destroyed the capital stock, they boosted per capita incomes among the survivors (Voigtländer and Voth 2012). harmful, intra-route form-with the latter spawning serious free rider and common pool problems (Epstein 2000; Rosenthal and Wong 2011, ch. 6) .
Meanwhile, Europe's assemblies had mixed potential for growth. They trade as were princes, when they could get away with it. So, empowering assemblies sometimes simply replaced rent-extracting monarchs with rent-extracting oligarchs (Epstein 2000; Stasavage 2014 ). Moreover, and von Hagen 2010). Both problems-rent extraction by closed oligarand could substantially worsen economic performance. Finally, David Newbery and Joseph Stiglitz's (1984) seminal article showed that increasing trade, without improving insurance, can lower welfare. To illustrate, suppose trade is initially negligible. Farmers who harvest meager crops due to locally bad weather can accordingly charge higher prices. Once regional trade in agricultural products commences, however, farmers suffering local shocks will simply lose income. The market, in other words, may increase both the mean and variance of their of freer trade would initially have been ambiguous in medieval Europe, given how poorly developed capital markets were. Indeed, Avner Greif, Murat Iyigun, and Diego Sasson (2013) argue that elite worries about the social disorder that market integration could bring strongly impeded development throughout Eurasia.
In the long term, the dark sides of political fragmentation, representative institutions and economic liberty could be mitigated. Because Europeans fought so many wars, they eventually developed mechanisms-such as establishing clear borders-that reduced their incidence. Because Europeans experienced so many oligarchic or imprudent assemblies, they eventually developed mechanisms to deal with these problems. In Great Britain, for example, the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 ended traditional urban oligarchies by extending suffrage rights to all ratepayers, exposing them to audit. Because Europeans traded so much, they eventually developed vibrant insurance markets, both private and social, thereby enabling them to more fully realize the wealth-creating potential of trade. In Britain, for example, Iyigun (2012a, 2012b) highlight the importance of the Old Poor Law.
In sum, Europeans had the opportunities to perfect multipolar balanceof-power politics, to improve how representative institutions operated, and to develop capital markets-and they eventually seized those opportunities. Meanwhile, in the rest of the world, large empires created a different international politics; there was no possibility of perfecting representative institutions, since none existed; and state regulation of trade reduced the demand for better insurance.
Why Not Elsewhere?
If European trade fostered inter-connected urban growth, then why did trade elsewhere not do so? The answer is that increasing trade in other regions did lead to more inter-connected urban growth. The effects were To illustrate, consider China. The Middle Kingdom experienced relatively high commercial activity under the Song and Yuan dynasties, and again during the "second commercial revolution" beginning in the midsixteenth century. In between, however, lay the Ming dynasty, whose founder commenced his reign in 1368 by systematically destroying the lower Yangzi's mercantile lineages and instituting a ban on maritime travel that "severely constricted the trade along the coast and with South East Asia…" (Rowe 2013, p. 311) . Meanwhile, merchants traveling within the empire "were required to stay and register at semi-governmental hostels, (p. 311). The rest of the economy was "minutely regulated." While China generally had low transit taxes (Rosenthal and Wong, p. 174) , the overall Ming reduction in trade freedom-with trading bans, travel restrictions, and continuing price controls-was profound.
As one would expect from this account, the century-by-century correlation between population growth and urban potential growth is lowest after the Ming rulers come to power (1400) and highest after the onset of the second commercial revolution. Even during China's second commercial revolution, however, inter-city growth correlations were less than half the level observed in Western Europe. This resonates with Wolfgang -ments in interest rates, that eighteenth-century England's capital market was much better integrated than even the Yangzi Delta's.
CONCLUSION
Beginning circa 1500, the economies of northwest Europe diverged from their Eurasian competitors (Broadberry 2013, p. 10) . Beginning in the late eighteenth century, with Great Britain leading the way, these economies embarked on a path of industrialization and "modern" economic growth. They thereby broke a pattern-of nearly zero longterm growth in per capita income-which they had shared with the rest of the world throughout recorded history.
Explaining this great divergence of European economies from the rest of the world has been a central goal in the social sciences since the nineteenth century. 13 One line of thinking argues that Europe's unique political innovations-self-governing cities and national parliaments-limited princely predation, thereby improving the security of property rights and fostering Smithian growth (e.g., North 1981; North and Weingast 1989; De Long and Shleifer 1993; Acemoglu et al. 2005) . Complementing these property-centered accounts, I argue that political fragmentation -tions rulers could impose on trade and, hence, how inter-connected urban growth could become. Thus, within Eurasia I expect the highest inter-city growth correlations to arise in its most fragmented and parliamentary region, Western Europe. Within Western Europe, I expect the highest correlations in the most fragmented and parliamentary sub-regions.
To empirically explore these predictions, I introduce a distanceweighted measure of inter-city growth correlations. This measure correlates with traditional measures of market integration based on co-movements in prices, but also picks up deeper forms of economic integration, such as cooperation in specialized production chains. Using this new measure, I show that different networks of trading cities in Eurasia experienced quite different inter-city growth correlations. Correlations the most fragmented and parliamentary of all the Old World's regions. Within Western Europe, inter-city growth correlations were particularly survived.
Although Europe began to diverge in terms of economic liberty as soon as the wave of communes and parliaments washed over the continent, it was three centuries before greater liberty generated a detectable advantage in per capita income and another three centuries before this advanaccrued slowly for many reasons, including: (1) endemic warfare; (2) monarchs' efforts to suppress representative institutions, as soon as they could; (3) oligarchs' efforts to use representative institutions to suppress To explore the validity of assumption (a), I again used Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden's data. I regressed Growth jt on ln(pop j,t-1 ) and UPGrowth jt , allowing the coefUPGrowth jt to shift between small cities and big cities. Here, UPGrowth jt is big and small cities were to nearby urban growth. Thus, big cities were representative of all cities in terms of their sensitivity to nearby urban growth, at least in the western core. Finally, I replicated the results for Western Europe from Model 2, Table 2 , using Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden's dataset. Thus, the results for Europe are not due to some peculiarity in how Biguzzi covered that region.
Once the same sampling frame is imposed, the mean population of the sampled cities in the various regions becomes more similar. For example, the mean population of the Western European cities entering the analysis in Model 2 (Table 2) 
